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1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. Croatia, in principle, supports Turkey’s EU membership 
Croatia and Turkey officially started negotiations with the European Union (EU) on the same day: 
3 October 2005. Unlike Turkey, Croatia joined the EU in 2013. As a new member state, Croatia 
has not been an actor of relevance in the long history of negotiations between Turkey and the 
EU and seems to prefer to remain so. Aware of difficulties related to Turkey͛s accession to the 
EU and of the internal challenges that Turkey is facing today, Croatia appears to prefer to stay on 
the margins of the negotiation procedure. It seems that the enthusiastic support for Turkey͛s EU 
membership is becoming more cautious than in the past.  
Croatia traditionally considers itself a friend of Turkey and empathizes with a country going 
through a lengthy and demanding accession process such as Turkey. Croatia, therefore, would 
not want to find itself in a situation in which it creates obstacles for Turkey. Additionally, there 
are no open bilateral issues between the two countries that would link the Turkish accession 
negotiations to Croatian domestic politics. 
Croatia views EU-Turkey relations through several angles: there is a general understanding of 
Turkey as an important partner for the EU; at the same time, concerns expressed by some EU 
member states with regard to recent political and security developments in Turkey are being 
taken seriously. 
The conservative coalition government of Croatian Democratic Union and The Bridge of 
Independent Lists (HDZ-MOST) along with the President of the Republic who comes from HDZ (a 
party established by the first Croatian President Franjo Tudjman) are generally more favourable 
to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and to President Recep Tayyip ErdoğaŶ. 
Social-democrats and other more liberal political, academic and civic actors are much more 
critical with respect to media censoring and other authoritarian tendencies in Turkey. 
As a pro-enlargement member state, Croatia supports accession of all candidate countries on 
the condition that they meet the criteria laid down by the EU. This is justified by its own 
experience since Croatia had to fulfill all conditions in order to qualify for EU membership.  
The situation in Turkey is observed from a distance and EU-Turkey relations are judged in a 
broader framework of national interests and positions of other member states, in particular 
those to which Croatia feels close, such as Germany and Austria, as well as the Visegrad 
countries. 
                                                          
1
 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
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1.2. A narrative oscillating between a recent and a more distant past 
The debate on a potential membership of Turkey in the EU, as in most other countries, 
intertwines several lines of thinking. Traditionally, Croatia would identify itself as the ͞other͟ in 
relation to Turkey, being a country whose historical enemy was the Ottoman Empire and which 
built its national identity to a large extent on the history of battles against the Ottomans. 
Particularly, the battle in which Croatia, in cooperation with Venetians, defeated Ottomans at 
Sinj in Dalmatia in 1717 is commemorated. 
A concept of antemurale Christianitatis, which sees Croatia as a country that stood at the 
borders of Europe defending it from the Ottoman invasions, therefore, resonates vividly in the 
ĐouŶtry͛s history. 
However, today Croatia is building a new partnership with Turkey by acknowledging the Turkish 
support for its quest for independence in the 1990s and by recognizing Turkey as regional power 
linking Europe and Asia.  
With respect to norms and values, conservative and liberal circles maintain expectedly divergent 
views on developments in Turkey. Conservative circles demonstrate a certain degree of 
understanding for the re-introduction of traditional values in the society (such as a prominent 
role for religion) and in general more tolerance for curbing liberal values that they consider as 
alien and imported in the Croatian society. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to focus on the 
suppression of freedoms, a faltering human rights record, squashing minority rights, media 
censoring and other forms of restrictions to liberal democracy. In their view, these changes 
warrant concern and justify the freezing of Turkey͛s aĐĐessioŶ negotiations. 
Both liberal and conservative circles, however, stress the importance of Turkey as a military 
power, an ally within NATO, an advancing economy and a country with growing foreign policy 
ambitions, situated in one of the most strategically relevant parts of the globe. Therefore, the 
dominant view is that Turkey cannot be ignored but, instead, the EU needs to find a way to 
constructively engage with an ever-changing Turkey. 
1.3. Broad panoply of issues 
Migration has been one of the most important areas of concern and policy debate, especially in 
the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. The general understanding is that Turkey itself is in an 
unfavourable position catering for nearly three million refugees, while the EU was also facing a 
breaking point after receiving a million refugees. Still, perception of Turkey is precarious, 
depending on a number of interrelated issues, not only a humanitarian one. While Croatian 
officials refrain from openly criticizing Turkey, media and independent analysts are adding to the 
migration debate views that assess also the Turkish role in the Syrian war and the politics of 
President ErdoğaŶ, including the Kurdish question. 
Possible visa liberalization is also discussed in the context of migration. This discussion includes 
Syrian refugees and potential Turkish asylum seekers alike. The perception is that, one way or 
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another, migration from Turkey will remain high: as a transit country as long as the war in Syria 
does not end and as a country of origin as long as the political situation in Turkey does not 
improve. Croatia officially supports the liberalization of the visa regime for Turkish citizens, 
following the fulfilment of benchmarks in the negotiation process. 
The economic and trade relations with Turkey also represent a focal interest. The EU has been 
for years the biggest investor in Turkey. Political rifts may affect economic relations, yet it is 
unclear to which extent. The relationship between Turkey and Croatia are good, but the 
potentials significantly exceed the level of current economic cooperation. Since bilateral trade is 
relatively low, business opportunities were seen primarily through a prism of possible Turkish 
investments in Croatia, primarily in tourism. With the perception of a deterioration of the 
seĐurity situatioŶ iŶ Turkey folloǁiŶg the atteŵpted Đoup iŶ July ϮϬϭϲ, Croatia͛s tourist iŶdustry 
expects to profit from tourists who will, instead of Turkey, choose Croatia as destination for their 
summer vacation. 
Finally, Turkey͛s role in European efforts to diversify energy supply is noted. Croatia considers 
Turkey as one of the key actors in the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor projects and 
monitors with great attention the implementation of the TAP-TANAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline-
Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) project and its link with IAP (Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline). 
Finally, Turkey͛s relations with Russia are also closely watched. This is largely linked to security in 
Europe and in the region of South-Eastern Europe in particular. With respect to the prospects of 
EU accession for candidate and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans, both 
Russia and Turkey are now perceived by a number of analysts as countries that do not support 
the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans any longer unconditionally. They compete with the 
EU for influence in the Western Balkans and this competition may be a source of various 
tensions.  
2. Future of EU-Turkey Relations 
2.1. Traditional support for Turkey’s EU membership in new circumstances 
General views on the future of EU-Turkey relations in Croatia seem to be influenced by the 
traditionally good own bilateral relationship without open issues, as well as by Turkey͛s role in 
the security and stability of South-Eastern Europe. Turkey is perceived as a specific country in 
the European neighbourhood: a member of G20 and a regional power with a unique relationship 
with the EU. The country is considered to be an important partner in solving the refugee crisis, 
and an important actor in the energy sector.  
The main concerns of independent analysts and civil society activists regarding a possible Turkish 
EU membership relate to its readiness and ability to carry out necessary reforms and sustain 
democratic standards, respect for human rights and a functional secular state. 
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Some Croatian politicians fear that Turkey͛s EU accession might cause institutional problems in 
the EU, noting that Turkey would become the second ͞ďiggest͟ ŵeŵďer state after Germany 
according to number of votes in the Council and number of seats in the European Parliament. 
Serious concerns also relate to different attitudes of citizens in countries like Germany and 
FraŶĐe, ǁhiĐh are Ŷot supportiǀe of Turkey͛s ŵeŵďership for different reasons.  
The Ottoman historical heritage has not raised ideological concerns in Croatia related to an 
eventual EU membership of Turkey. Religious reasons are neither triggering wide-range concerns 
nor seen as crucial obstacles. However, numerous concerns were raised by independent analysts 
and civil society representatives regarding developments that followed the failed military coup 
attempt on 15 July 2016, i.e. extensive suspensions, dismissals, arrests and detentions. Problems 
related to the rule of law and respect of fundamental rights, freedom of expression and media, 
as well as the possibility of reintroducing the death penalty raised concerns in Croatia. Another 
issue that attracted attention is the process of negotiations regarding the re-unification of 
Cyprus.  
There does not seem to be a significant difference between the position of political and 
economic elites and the population as a whole. Political and economic elites seem to be more 
supportive of Turkey than in some other EU member states. The same applies to the public 
support, according the Eurobarometer reports. The support for Turkey͛s accession to the EU in 
Croatia in the period 2005-2010 was almost twice as high as the EU average. Namely, in 2005 
some 57 percent of Croatian citizens supported the idea of Turkey becoming a part of the EU in 
the future (whilst the EU average was 32 percent only). In 2010, the support for Turkey͛s 
membership was 64 percent in Croatia, while the EU average was less than a half of it (30.5 
percent). Secondly, it can be observed that support for Turkey in Croatia increased in the 
mentioned five-year period, whilst the EU average slightly decreased. 
2.2. Focusing on the open-ended nature of accession negotiations 
Concepts of differentiated integratioŶ suĐh as ͞priǀileged͟ or ͞strategiĐ͟ partŶership, ǁere Ŷot 
ǁidely deďated iŶ Croatia. Hoǁeǀer, iŶ disĐussioŶs oŶ Turkey͛s prospeĐts regardiŶg eǀeŶtual EU 
membership, the substance of its specific Negotiation Framework is frequently mentioned, as a 
relevant starting position. The Negotiation Framework of Croatia, which started negotiations 
with the EU on the same day as Turkey, guaranteed full membership as its final outcome. Turkey 
was in a quite different position. Although the shared objective of the negotiations with Turkey 
was accession, the negotiations were envisaged to be an open-ended process, whose outcome 
was not guaranteed beforehand. Turkey still had the obligation to fulfil all Copenhagen accession 
criteria but, in case the country would not be in a position to fully assume all obligations of 
membership, it should ďe guaraŶteed that Turkey ǁould ďe ͞fully aŶĐhored iŶ the EuropeaŶ 
struĐtures through the stroŶgest possiďle ďoŶd͟ ;see: NegotiatioŶ Fraŵeǁork for Turkey, poiŶt 
2). According to Croatian politicians, a certain kind of privileged partnership might be beneficial 
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in any case, given the demographic and economic size of the country. Considering current 
developments, the step towards such a solution could be an upgrade of trade relations with 
Turkey at the EU level, or by other means currently discussed at the Council of the EU. Finally, 
there are opinions in academic circles in Croatia that, whatever the outcome of accession 
negotiations, the Turkish case might be too complex to be admitted, primarily because of its 
potential influence in EU institutions due to the size of the country, but also its heterogeneity. At 
the same time, Turkey itself is questioning its willingness to become a full EU member state. 
Most of the observers perceive that the future relations between EU and Turkey will continue to 
be determined through slow negotiations, obstacles and delays in the coming years. 
 
2.3. Events in Turkey and in Croatia that affected the debate  
One of the recent events that influenced the public debate on EU-Turkey relations was the visit 
of President Erdoğan along with a large delegation to Croatia (April 2016), on the occasion of the 
100
th
 anniversary of the recognition of Islam as an official religion in Croatia. The aim of this 
state visit was also to strengthen mutual economic relations, particularly the Turkish 
investments in Croatia. It was orchestrated with great pomp including security precautions and a 
ceremonial reception in the national theatre. The conservative Croatian government and the 
Turkish President stressed the importance of good relations between the two nations and 
discussed potentials for increasing bilateral cooperation. 
Vocal criticism was raised by civil society activists, who protested against the fact that Croatia 
was hosting the Turkish President, who they held responsible for gross violations of human 
rights and media freedom. 
A series of events following the attempted military coup in Turkey in July 2016 attracted much 
attention and raised serious concerns of analysts and civil society regarding the direction the 
country was taking. In this context, the sudden withdrawal of the Turkish Ambassador in the 
autumn 2016 from Croatia, without clear explanation, was an additional reason for concern.  
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global Scene 
3.1. The war in Syria as a game changer 
Croatia perceives Turkey as a country with justified ambitions to conduct an active foreign policy 
in its neighbourhood and the broader region. In light of the large population, strong economy 
and strategic geopolitical position, it is not surprising that Turkey wants to emancipate its foreign 
policy and present itself as a regional power.  
Hoǁeǀer, iŶ light of Turkey͛s uŶsuĐĐessful ͞strategic depth͛͟ doĐtriŶe, this perĐeptioŶ has slightly 
changed in Croatia. Now, there is understanding that Turkey may have miscalculated its power 
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and ability to change the situation in the neighbourhood to its own advantage. Its actions, 
moreover, have been seen as detrimental not only to Turkey but also the EU.  
Turkey͛s backing of the opposition in Syria was initially supported by Croatia. The latter joined 
the Friends of Syria Group and the then foreign minister Vesna Pusić attended the second 
Group͛s ĐoŶfereŶĐe iŶ IstaŶďul iŶ ϮϬϭϮ. “iŶĐe theŶ, hoǁeǀer, Croatia has distanced itself from 
Turkey and the anti-Assad policies of the Turkish government.  
Turkey͛s clashes with the Kurdish minority and its military operations in the neighbourhood 
directed against the Kurds are also not met with support from some Croatian analysts, although 
such views are not widely expressed. Croatian politicians are silent on this topic, both in the 
government and in the opposition. 
3.2. Active role in the Balkans 
Turkey has been described as an ally of Croatia during the violent break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia. The former foreign minister Mate GraŶić explained that Turkey played a positive role 
in ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H): namely, the friendship of late presidents of 
Croatia and Turkey FraŶjo TuđŵaŶ and Süleyman Demirel was instrumental in ending the war 
between Croats and Bosnians in B&H. Indeed, Demirel was the only  foreign dignitary who 
atteŶded TudjŵaŶ͛s fuŶeral. 
Yet, the partnership from the recent past has been affected by the new developments in 
Southeastern Europe. Croatia supports EU enlargement in the region, with particular attention 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey, drifting away from the EU and with growing authoritarian 
and conservative tendencies, is no longer viewed exclusively as a stabilizing actor in the Balkans. 
Indeed, while there was a prospect for active Turkish accession negotiations with the EU, 
interests in the region of both the EU and Turkey converged. Currently, the perception in Croatia 
is that its neighbours in the Western Balkans may no longer view Turkey as a partner of the EU 
but as an alternative to it, much in the same light as Russia is. 
It is the official position of Croatia that Turkey and the EU still share the same goal of stability in 
the region and support the membership of the Western Balkan countries in the EU. Therefore, a 
͞wait and see͟ approach is adopted for the time being by Croatia. There is understanding that 
Turkey is struggling with serious issues of internal and external security as well as authoritarian 
trends and that its foreign policy activities in Southeastern Europe may be on hold for a while.  
3.3. Pragmatic partnership 
Relations between the United States and Russia affect Europe, in particular Turkey due to its 
geographical position. The view in Croatia is that the conflict in Syria and the situation in the 
Middle East engage global and regional powers, with Turkey being one of the key actors in these 
events. Moreover, it is pointed out in Croatia that, in order to findsolutions for a successful 
approach to migration and to enhance Europe͛s energy security, the EU needs Turkey. 
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The EU͛s gloďal aŵďitioŶs ǁould haǀe a higher prospeĐt of suĐĐess if the European Union  had a 
stable, prosperous and democratic Turkey on its side. It is believed in Croatia that both the EU 
and Turkey have benefitted from the accession process thus far. Thus, it seems obvious that it is 
in the interest of both sides to foster good relations and overcome the existing obstacles. 
Creativity in politics with respect for the position of the other may lead to new solutions that 
would be mutually beneficial. 
However, authoritarian tendencies, weakening secularism and curbing minority rights has its 
backlash on Turkey. Its security is already shaken, with the economy to follow. The EU counts on 
the resilience of the Turkish people to prevail over the current and upcoming challenges.  
Yet, for the time being, the ultimate issue in the Croatian debate remains the fear of ISIS, its 
sowing of terror and propaganda for further radicalization among Muslims in the Middle East, 
Europe as well as in Southeastern Europe. Although not officially stated, there is a sense that if 
Turkey would stand unequivocally and without reservation in fighting ISIS and radicalization, the 
understanding of its own hardships and tolerance for some of its oddities would grow. As always 
in politics, pragmatism prevails. 
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